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Exchange rate variability is one of the most salient features of international
macroeconomics. The managed exchange rate regimes adopted by many
countries or the creation of the European Economic and Monetary Union
have at least been partly motivated by a wish to dampen this variability.
Large exchange rate ￿ uctuations are nevertheless still observed: over the past
ten years the exchange rates of the euro and the dollar have ￿ uctuated a lot.
However, changes have been re￿ ected only moderately in domestic prices in
the euro area and in the US, which have both enjoyed stable in￿ ation - as
most industrialised countries1 -. These muted responses of macroeconomic
variables have drawn attention, inter alia, to the degree of transmission of
exchange rate movements along the pricing chain, i.e. exchange rate pass-
through (ERPT). Empirical studies that try to estimate the ERPT show
that it is far from perfect even for import prices "at the border" and in
the long run. These ￿ndings have given rise to extensive research which
provides di⁄erent explanations as to why the ERPT might be incomplete.
Along with price stickiness, real frictions are deemed necessary to account for
incomplete ERPT. Two main real frictions will be considered here. Firstly,
according to Corsetti and Dedola (2005), international price discrimination
will arise because the price elasticity of demand in a market depends on
local distribution costs which serve to segment national markets. Secondly,
following Kimball (1995) an elasticity of demand that is increasing in the
relative price will make the desired mark-up decreasing in the relative price
which will result in smaller price increases than there would be if the elasticity
of demand were constant.
This paper ￿rst aims at clearly identifying these di⁄erent real channels
and exploring their interactions in combination with nominal stickiness. Its
second purpose is to assess the quantitative importance of these various as-
sumptions for the exchange rate pass-trough to a broad range of prices, for
the real exchange rate and for the trade balance by looking at impulse re-
sponses in a uni￿ed framework.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section
presents a brief overview of the empirical and theoretical literature. The
third section speci￿es the two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model that incorporates the ingredients presented above, focusing on the
price formation mechanism. Section 4 presents the parameterisation of the
model, while an analysis of impulse responses to an Uncovered Interest Rate
1This is also the case for emerging economies like Argentina, Brazil, Korea, etc. (see
Burstein et al., 2005).
1Parity shock evaluates the extent to which these nominal and real frictions
have markedly di⁄erent implications for the behaviour of open economies.
Section 5 contains some concluding remarks. Finally, the appendix presents
the key derivations of the paper.
2 Brief overview of the literature
Empirically, a number of common ￿ndings emerge from the numerous studies
on the exchange rate pass-through. First, it is on average below one even
in the long run and at disaggregated levels. Second, it varies across sectors
(almost complete pass-trough for energy and commodities and quite low for
manufactured goods2) and countries. The ERPT is lowest for the US where
it has been estimated between 0.2 and 0.6 in the long run. As for the euro
area, the long-run (short-run), i.e. one-year (one-quarter), exchange rate
pass-through on extra-euro-area import prices ranges from a high 78 p.c. (62
p.c.) based on sectoral estimations for all euro area countries, (see Campa
and Gonzalez-Minguez, 2006) to 70 p.c. (20 p.c.) based on VAR models,
(Hahn, 2003, and Landolfo, 2007). Third, it is lower for consumer goods
than for wholesale prices.
Recently, some empirical studies have observed a decline in the ERPT.
The most striking evidence comes from the US. Marazzi et al. (2005), show
a substantial decline in the ERPT to import prices from a value above 0.5
in the 1970￿ s and 80￿ s to a value close to 0.2 for the last decade. BIS (2005),
Sekine (2005) and Ihrig, Marazzi, and Rothenberg (2006), have also detected
declines for the G-7 countries, although not always signi￿cant, in the 1990-
2004 period relative to the previous decades3. Yet this observation is dis-
puted. Hellerstein, Daly and Marsh (2006) estimate that the ERPT to import
prices in the US has only declined from 0.56 to 0.46 between the 1985-1994
and 1995-2005 periods, but this decline is not statistically signi￿cant4. In
addition, this decline in import price pass-through does not appear to be
a universal phenomenon. For some minor industrial countries like Australia
and Sweden, for example, it seems that the pass-through to import prices has
remained quite high5. A decline in import price pass-through suggests that
2For the manufacturing sector in the euro area, Anderton (2003) obtains a long run
ERPT in the range of 0.5 - 0.7 while Campa and Gonzalez-Minguez (2006) results are
between 0.6 and 0.8.
3For example, in the latter study, the ERPT to import prices has declined on average
from 0.7 to 0.5.
4They attribute the reduction observed in other studies to the inclusion of commodity
prices in the regression analysis.
5Campa and Goldberg (2005) also report a reduction of ERPT since 1990 for 15 of the
2exporters are increasingly absorbing exchange rate shocks into their domestic
currency margins, rather than changing their foreign currency prices.
Although ERPT regression models can be biased by omitted variables
and measurement errors, as shown by Corsetti et al. (2006), their main
￿ndings may give broad guidelines as to some desirable features of open
economy macroeconomic models: there is (i) less than full pass-through to
imported goods prices (at the dock) but (ii) more pass-through to imported
goods prices than to ￿nal goods prices and (iii) possibly a decline in the
pass-through.
These observations have posed a challenge to theoretical models. In re-
sponse an extensive literature has provided di⁄erent explanations as to why
ERPT might be incomplete. Recent research has been conducted in the new
open economy macroeconomic framework based on optimising behaviour6.
The transmission to consumer prices has received much attention. One trend
in this literature along the lines of Obstfeld and Rogo⁄(1995, 1998 and 2000)
has assumed that prices are sticky in the producer￿ s currency, PCP. Firms
pre-set prices in their own currencies whether for sale to home or foreign
markets. Here the response of import prices to the exchange rate is still one
to one, but of course the impact on consumer prices depends on the import
share or on some additional stickiness added by importers. Another trend
(Betts and Devereux, 1996, 2000, for example) has assumed that import
prices in each market are temporarily rigid in local currency. Under local
currency pricing, LCP, which is an extreme case of Pricing-To-Market, there
is no pass-through of exchange rates to import prices. Domestic ￿rms set
one price for sales in their own country and another price in foreign currency
for sales abroad. As a result, import prices in each country are rigid in the
consumer￿ s currency and this nominal rigidity impedes the transmission of
exchange rate changes to consumer prices in the short run.
Exogenous nominal frictions have then been introduced to build models
with more realistic price dynamics. With price staggering, for example, prices
of only a fraction of imported or exported goods can be adjusted in each
period and can respond to exchange rate changes. This set-up implies that
the pass-through coe¢ cient is greater than zero in the short run for import
prices and less than one for export prices. In order to improve their empirical
performance, these models have also been supplemented by backward-looking
indexation schemes and wage staggering (see for instance Smets and Wouters,
2002).
21 countries they studied, albeit insigni￿cant in most cases. They ascribe this reduction to
a composition e⁄ect in favour of manufactured goods for which ERPT is lower in aggregate
imports rather than to a change in the relation between prices and exchange rate.
6For a very good survey, see Lane (2001).
3Burstein et al. (2003) take a di⁄erent direction from nominal frictions.
They observe that the consumer price also includes non-traded marketing,
distribution and retailing services and that these costs may be high. Ex-
change rate changes only a⁄ect the wholesale price, i.e. import price "at the
border", which is only a small part of the ￿nal retail price of the distributed
good. The argument is that the law of one price may hold for the good
"at the border", as in PCP models, but does not hold at the level of the
consumer price because it includes the price of non-traded domestic inputs
for which the law of one price does not necessarily have to apply. In addi-
tion, distribution services have helped Burstein et al. (2007) to show why
domestic in￿ ation has not risen much even after large devaluations. They use
the fact that the price adjustment in the non-traded sector is slow. In this
context, they explain price sluggishness without turning to nominal frictions
but rather by resorting to real rigidities, a ￿ at marginal cost curve and a
demand elasticity increasing in the ￿rm￿ s price relative to its competitors in
the non-traded sector.
However, as shown above, imperfect exchange rate pass-through to im-
port prices "at the border" is a well-documented phenomenon, i.e. the law
of one price does not hold for a large number of tradables even at the bor-
der. To account for this incomplete pass-through both "at the border" and
at the consumer level, Corsetti and Dedola (2005) develop a richer model
of monopolistic competition among traded goods producers. In their model,
international price discrimination arises because the price elasticity of de-
mand in a market depends on local distribution costs which serve to segment
national markets. Although ￿rms set prices ￿ exibly, the law of one price fails
for traded goods because of di⁄erent "perceived" price elasticities. Distrib-
ution costs are added to the price of imported goods and a change in the
latter will a⁄ect the retail price only proportionally to the import content
in the retail price. The demand reaction to this change will thus also be
muted. Moreover, the exchange rate determines the relative weight of the
traded good price in the retail price and thus in￿ uences the mark-ups.
In the spirit of Dornbusch (1987), incomplete pass-through may not pri-
marily re￿ ect price stickiness but arises from imperfectly competitive ￿rms
that ￿nd it optimal to adjust their mark-up and not only prices in response
to exchange rate changes. Yet, in the absence of distribution costs, even if
￿rms were given the ability to set di⁄erent prices in di⁄erent national market
markets, there is no reason for them to do so, given that, when preferences
are of the Constant Elasticity of Substitution type, they care only about
their own costs. Bergin and Feenstra (2000, 2001) build general equilibrium
models in which the pass-through is not perfect even with ￿ exible prices. To
circumvent the fact that under CES preferences strategic interaction with
4other ￿rms is excluded, they instead introduce "translog" preferences. They
use a model with staggered pricing and show that endogenous real exchange
rate persistence can be increased by a variable demand elasticity, a low de-
gree of openness or a large role for intermediate materials in production, but
not to the extent actually observed in the data.
Other authors - e.g. Bouakez (2005), de Walque et al. (2005), Gust and
Sheets (2006), Landry (2006), Sbordone (2008) - have applied recipes from
the closed economy sticky-price literature7 to open economy models. This
research agenda introduces more general variable demand elasticity. More
speci￿cally, it considers the class of aggregator suggested by Kimball (1995)
that yields an elasticity of demand that is increasing in the relative price. The
fact that the elasticity of demand is increasing in the relative price means
that the desired mark-up is decreasing in the relative price which results in
smaller price increases than there would be if the elasticity of demand were
constant. Hence, allowing for desired mark-up variations leads to additional
price stickiness beyond that resulting from the exogenous nominal frictions.
Consequently, it also helps to rationalise a large degree of nominal rigidity
with a reasonable exogenous length of nominal contracts. In open economy
models the relative price di⁄erential implies that a ￿rm may face di⁄erent
demand elasticities at home and abroad.
This review indicates several features that might improve the open econ-
omy model:
1. Non-traded goods in the consumption basket: to get an ERPT lower
at the consumer price level than at the import price level;
2. Staggered prices: to have persistence and an ERPT lower in the short
run than in the long run;
3. Distribution sector: because it is important empirically and allows a
lower ERPT to the retail price of import than to the price at the border
and allows the latter to be less than one in the long run;
4. Endogenous variable demand elasticity: because of the need for a model
in which prices and real exchange rate deviations last longer than the
rigidity imposed by a realistic length of price contracts. These strategic
mark-up variations are also motivated by the results from a market-
speci￿c study that analyses the source of inertia in the price of imports.
In a study on the beer market in the US, Goldberg and Hellerstein
7e.g. Kimball (1995), Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007), Dotsey and King (2005 ), Coenen
and Levin (2004), Levin et al. (2007).
5(2007) attribute the source of local currency price stability for 54.1 p.c.
to local non-traded costs, 33.7 p.c. to mark-up adjustment and 12.2
p.c. to price adjustment cost. These results shed light on the prevailing
importance of real rigidities in explaining imperfect ERPT.
The introduction of variable demand elasticity o⁄ers a solution to deal
with the documented decline in the ERPT. Distribution services can explain
low pass-through but not the decrease in the ERPT. The period in which
this possible decrease was observed is actually a period of increasing glob-
alisation and there is no reason to believe that with more open markets,
traded goods would require more domestic-cost-intensive services to be sold.
Rather enhanced competition may have made producers more attentive to
their relative price and thus less inclined to change their prices in response
to exchange rate movements. The demand elasticity could also change with
market conditions other than the relative price and these market conditions
could evolve through time.
3 The model
The world economy consists of two countries of equal size denoted as Home,
H, and Foreign, F. In each country, there is a continuum of in￿nitely-lived
households and there are two sectors: one producing traded goods, the other
producing non-traded goods. The traded sector produces a tradable good
in a number of varieties indexed by h 2 [0;1] in the Home country and
f 2 [0;1] in the Foreign country. The non-traded sector produces a contin-
uum of di⁄erentiated non-traded goods, indexed by n 2 [0;1]. Traded goods
are the only goods exchanged internationally. Non-traded goods are either
consumed or used to make tradable goods h and f available to domestic con-
sumers. Variables located in the Foreign country are indexed by an asterisk
￿ ￿￿ . Firms producing traded and non-traded goods are monopolistically com-
petitive and produce one variety of goods only. These ￿rms use di⁄erentiated
domestic labour as inputs. For clarity, only the home-country variables and
maximisation problems are described. The foreign country faces perfectly
similar problems.
3.1 Domestic Households
In each country, there is a continuum of households indexed by ￿ 2 [0;1],
each one supplying a di⁄erentiated labour force. As in Smets and Wouters
6(2003b), Home agent ￿￿ s intertemporal V utility is de￿ned as
Vt (￿) ￿ Et
1 X
j=0
￿
j
￿
1
1 ￿ ￿c
(Ct+j (￿) ￿ Ht+j)
￿1￿￿c
￿exp
￿
￿c ￿ 1
1 + ￿‘
‘t+j (￿)
1+￿‘
￿
(1)
where ￿c is the degree of relative risk aversion and ￿‘ the elasticity of work
e⁄ort with respect to the real wage. The external habit variable is assumed
to be proportional to aggregate past consumption: Ht = hCt￿1:
Households￿total income consists of labour income (net of taxes) and
the dividend received from the imperfect competitive intermediate traded
(h) and non-traded (n) ￿rms in the Home economy. All domestic ￿rms are
entirely owned by domestic households and each domestic household holds
an equal share in all ￿rms.
The asset market structure in the model is standard in the literature.
Home households hold their ￿nancial wealth in the form of domestic bonds
BH;t and foreign bonds BF;t denominated in foreign currency. Bonds are one-
period securities with a nominal gross return Rt and R￿
t respectively for the
domestic and foreign bonds. As in Benigno (2001), to ensure a unique steady
state equilibrium with a zero net foreign asset position, Home households are
assumed to face a transaction cost when they take a position in the foreign
bond market. This cost depends on the net foreign asset position of the
Home economy8.
Each household maximises its utility subject to the ￿ ow budget con-
straint:
BH;t (￿)
Rt
+
StBF;t (￿)
R￿
t￿(StBF;t=Pt)
￿ BH;t￿1 (￿) + R
￿
tStBF;t￿1 (￿) + wt (￿)‘t (￿)
+
Z 1
0
divt (h;￿)dh +
Z 1
0
divt (n;￿)dn
￿PtCt (￿) (2)
This maximisation problem yields the following ￿rst-order conditions
￿t = Rt￿Et
￿
￿t+1
Pt
Pt+1
￿
(3)
￿t = R
￿
t￿(StBF;t=Pt)￿Et
￿
￿t+1
St+1Pt
StPt+1
￿
(4)
8The cost function ￿() equals one when the net foreign asset position is at steady state
level of zero. If they hold net foreign assets they receive a return lower than R￿; whereas
if they are net debtors they have to pay more than foreign borrowers do.
7where ￿t is the marginal utility of consumption and is given by
￿t = (Ct ￿ Ht)
￿￿c ￿ exp
￿
￿c ￿ 1
1 + ￿‘
‘
1+￿‘
t
￿
(5)
and S is the nominal exchange rate, measured in units of Foreign currency
per unit of Home currency9. Combining (3) and (4) yields the uncovered
interest rate parity that determines the nominal exchange rate:
Et
￿
St+1
St
￿
=
Rt
R￿
t￿(StBF;t=Pt) ￿ "
uip
t
(6)
where an exogenous autoregressive risk premium shock "
uip
t has been added to
account for exogenous variations in international ￿nancial market conditions
(see Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe, 2003).
3.2 Labour market
The treatment of the labour market and wage setting is the same as in Smets
and Wouters (2003b), but made suitable for a two-sector economy.
Each worker acts as a monopolistic supplier of a di⁄erentiated type of
labour input to all ￿rms either in the traded or non-traded sector in the do-
mestic economy (there is no labour mobility across countries). Each house-
hold sells di⁄erentiated labour services to a competitive ￿rm, i.e. "labour
packer" that packages them into a homogeneous input used for producing
both tradable and non-tradable goods. Since the labour services are not
perfect substitutes, households have some monopoly power and are there-
fore wage setters. Subject to a Calvo-type contract, they can only choose
their wage optimally with a probability of (1 ￿ ￿w). When they cannot re-
optimise, their wage is indexed to both past consumer price in￿ ation and to
trend in￿ ation, with respective shares ￿w and (1 ￿ ￿w): Optimising house-
holds choose their optimal nominal wage e wt (￿) in order to maximise their
intertemporal utility function (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) and
the following labour demand curve:
‘
j
t (￿) =
 
w
j
t (￿)
W
j
t
!￿ 1+￿w
￿w
L
j
t
where W
j
t is the price index for labour inputs in sector j = H; N:
9Thus an increase in S corresponds to a depreciation of the domestic currency.
8The total labour supply of individual ￿ is ‘(￿): It is assumed that from
the individual point of view, supplying labour to the traded or non-traded
sector is equivalent (i.e. labour supply in the traded and non-traded sector
are perfect substitutes). As shown in Erceg et al. (2000), the labour packer
combines individual households￿supply according to:
Lt =
￿Z 1
0
‘
j
t (￿)
1
1+￿w d￿
￿1+￿w
and the corresponding price index for labour inputs
Wt =
￿Z 1
0
w
j
t (￿)
￿ 1
￿w d￿
￿￿￿w
where j = H; N: In order to keep the labour market structure symmetric be-
tween sectors, the elasticity of substitution between labour, 1+￿w
￿w , is assumed
to be the same in the traded and non-traded sectors. Optimising households
will set their wage rate as a mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure:
W t
Pt
= (1 + ￿w)
U0
‘;t
￿t
where U0
‘ is the marginal disutility of labour which is equal across households
and is given by
U
0
‘;t =
￿
1
1 ￿ ￿c
(Ct ￿ hCt￿1)
￿1￿￿c
￿ exp
￿
￿c ￿ 1
1 + ￿‘
‘
1+￿‘
t+j
￿
(￿c ￿ 1)‘t .
With the partial adjustment and indexation mechanisms described above,
their optimisation problem yields to the ￿rst-order condition:
Et
1 X
j=0
(￿w￿)
j ￿t+jPt
￿tPt+j
‘t+j (￿)
￿w
￿
(1 + ￿w)W t+j ￿
￿
￿
j
k=0￿
￿w
t+k￿1￿
(1￿￿w)￿
e wt (￿)
￿
= 0
and the aggregate wage equation is:
Wt =
￿
(1 ￿ ￿w) e w
1
￿w
t + ￿w
￿
￿
￿w
t￿1￿
(1￿￿w)Wt￿1
￿ 1
￿w
￿￿w
93.3 Demand structure
Aggregate consumption10, C is an index of home Non-traded CN and com-
posite Traded CT goods
Ct =
 ￿
￿1
￿1 + (￿2 + ￿3)
￿ 1
￿
C
N
￿￿1
￿
t +
￿
(￿2 + ￿3)
￿1 + (￿2 + ￿3)
￿ 1
￿
C
T
￿￿1
￿
t
! ￿
￿￿1
(7)
where ￿ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between traded and
non-traded goods and ￿1 determines the agent￿ s bias towards the non-tradable
goods while ￿2 will determine the bias towards domestic traded goods and
￿3 the bias towards imported goods in the demand for the composite traded
good. Households allocate aggregate consumption based on the demand func-
tions:
C
N
t =
￿1
￿1 + (￿2 + ￿3)
￿
P N
t
Pt
￿￿￿
Ct
C
T
t =
(￿2 + ￿3)
￿1 + (￿2 + ￿3)
￿
P T
t
Pt
￿￿￿
Ct
The corresponding competitive price index is
Pt =
￿￿
￿1
￿1 + (￿2 + ￿3)
￿
￿
P
N
t
￿(1￿￿)
+
￿
(￿2 + ￿3)
￿1 + (￿2 + ￿3)
￿
￿
P
T
t
￿(1￿￿)
￿ 1
(1￿￿)
(8)
The composite Traded goods are a combination of (intermediate) goods pro-
duced in the Home and in the Foreign economy. In addition, bringing traded
goods to the ￿nal demand requires the use of domestic non-traded goods,
called distribution services. This feature creates a wedge between the "whole-
sale" prices - i.e. the producer￿ s price of traded goods or the price "at the
border" for imports - and their "retail" prices. Thus the composite Traded
goods result from the aggregation of home-Traded-and-Distributed goods,
Y TD
H , along with imported-and-Distributed Foreign goods, Y TD
F , according
to the following technology:
C
T
t =
 ￿
￿2
￿2 + ￿3
￿ 1
￿
Y
TD ￿￿1
￿
H;t +
￿
￿3
￿2 + ￿3
￿ 1
￿
Y
TD ￿￿1
￿
F;t
! ￿
￿￿1
(9)
10In the absence of investment and government, consumption is the ￿nal domestic de-
mand .
10where ￿ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home pro-
duced and imported traded intermediate goods.
The composite Traded goods aggregators are perfectly competitive and, in
order to maximise their pro￿ts each period they follow the optimal allocation
between home-traded and imported goods as given by:
Y
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t (10)
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The corresponding price index is
P
T
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￿￿
￿2
￿2 + ￿3
￿
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￿
￿3
￿2 + ￿3
￿
P
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F;t
￿ 1
1￿￿
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where P TD
H and P TD
F are respectively the price of traded Home and Foreign
goods once distributed (i.e. the retail price of traded goods).
3.3.1 Distribution sector
As in Burnstein Neves et al. (2003) and Corsetti and Dedola (2005), traded
Home and imported Foreign goods varieties need to go through distribution
channels before their use in the production of the ￿nal goods Y TD
H and Y TD
F .
The perfectly competitive retailers which distribute the traded goods use the
non-traded bundle as the only additional input in production of Y TD
H and
Y TD
F . Moreover, these inputs are considered as perfect complements so that
the quantity of "retail" imported goods and of "retail" home-traded goods
are respectively given by
Y
TD
F;t (f) = Min
￿
1
1 + ￿
Y
T
F;t (f);
￿
1 + ￿
Y
N(d)
F;t
￿
(13)
Y
TD
H;t (h) = Min
￿
1
1 + ￿
Y
T
H;t (h);
￿
1 + ￿
Y
N(d)
H;t
￿
(14)
With this Leontief technology for distribution, one unit of distributed traded
good is made up of 1
1+￿ unit of genuine traded good and ￿
1+￿ unit of the
non-traded bundle.
113.3.2 Homogenous goods assemblers
The homogenous goods Y N
t , Y T
Ht and Y T
Ft are produced by perfectly compet-
itive assemblers using a continuum of inputs yN
t (n), yT
ht (h), yT
ft (f) which
are respectively intermediate domestic non-tradable11 (N) and domestic (h)
tradable (T) goods and imported (m) intermediate goods that are produced
by the monopolist intermediate goods sectors. As in Kimball (1995), the
processing technology is given for each ￿nal good by the implicit functions12
1 =
Z 1
0
G
￿
yN
t (n)
Y N
t
￿
dn
1 =
Z 1
0
G
￿
yT
ht (h)
Y T
Ht
￿
dh
1 =
Z 1
0
G
 
yT
ft (f)
Y T
Ft
!
df
Subject to this technology, each assembler minimises the cost of producing
respectively Y N
t , Y T
Ht and Y T
Ft taking the price of each of the intermediate
goods pN
t (n), pTD
h;t (h) and pTD
f;t (f) as given. The solution to this problem
implicitly de￿nes the relative individual input demands for each intermediate
good i, i = n;h;f, as a function of its relative price13:
y
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t (n) = G
0￿1
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￿ It
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3.4 Intermediate goods producers
11Non-tradables need not be indexed by "h" or "f" since they are produced and used in
the same country.
12G is increasing and strictly concave with G(1) = 1. Since, a ￿rst-order approximation
to the model will be used, as in Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), there is no need to specify
a functional form for G.
13With ￿ exible prices, the producer price indexes of these three categories of intermediate
goods would be de￿ned as a weighted sum of prices over individual good ratios: PN
ht =
R 1
0 pN
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Y TD
t dh; PTD
ft =
R 1
0 pTD
ft (f)
y
TD
ft (f)
Y TD
ft
df.
123.4.1 Factor demands and marginal costs
Intermediate goods ￿rms producing either non-traded yN
t (n) or traded goods
which can be sold at Home yT
ht (h) or in the Foreign economy y￿
h;t (h) are acting
in monopolistic sectors characterised by sticky prices. Each of them has a
production function with labour as the only input:
y
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where the autoregressive productivity shocks "AN
t and "AT
t are sector-speci￿c.
Thus, the marginal costs di⁄er across sectors only in the presence of the
sector-speci￿c productivity shocks.
In equilibrium, production in the non-traded sector meets demand coming
from 3 sources: ￿nal consumption of non-traded goods, inputs in distribution
services needed to bring home-traded goods and imports to the ￿nal demand.
Production in the traded sector satis￿es Home demand for tradables and
exports:
Y
N
ht (n) =
Z 1
0
y
N
t (n)dn = C
N
t (n) + Y
N(d)
H;t (n) + Y
N(d)
F;t (n) (18)
Y
T
ht (h) =
Z 1
0
y
T
h;t (h) + y
T￿
h;t (h)dh (19)
3.4.2 Price-setting behaviour
The prices of intermediate goods producers are determined according to
Calvo mechanisms. Each ￿rm receives an opportunity to reset its price with
a probability of (1 ￿ !). Prices that cannot be adjusted are index-linked to
past in￿ ation in their sector with a weight ￿p and to trend in￿ ation with a
weight
￿
1 ￿ ￿p
￿
. From the Home economy perspective, four prices are impor-
tant: the prices set by home-traded goods ￿rms on the Home market and on
the Foreign market, i.e. the price of exports, the price set by Foreign-traded
goods ￿rms on the Home market, i.e. the price of imports, and ￿nally the
price set by Home non-traded ￿rms. The formula for setting these prices is
derived as follows:
13Traded goods producers. Traded goods producers sell their products
to the ￿nal goods assemblers and can charge di⁄erent prices at home and
abroad. Their demand on the domestic market given by (16) depends on
the retail price of their goods. Let us assume the price of non-tradables is
p(n) = P N. Then, given the assumed complementarity between traded and
non-traded goods in the distribution sector, the "retail" price of a domestic
traded good distributed at Home is
p
TD
h;t+j (h) =
1
1 + ￿
e p
T
ht (h)Xt;j +
￿
1 + ￿
P
N
t+j (20)
And an analogue expression holds for the "retail" price of exports:
p
TD￿
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1
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where:
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.
A representative ￿rm in the sector thus sells its output on both the domestic,
yT
h, and foreign, yT￿
h , markets and chooses prices e pT
ht and e p￿
ht to maximise its
expected pro￿t stream:
Et
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(!￿)
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￿tPt+j
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4
e pT
ht (h)Xt;jyT
h;t+j (h)
+St+je pT￿
ht (h)XH￿
t;j yT￿
h;t+j (h)
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s.t.
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where ￿t is the marginal utility of consumption and
h
￿j￿t+jPt
￿tPt+j
i
is the nominal
discount factor for households which are the ￿nal owners the ￿rms. For an
exported good the domestic ￿rm earns St+je pT￿
ht XH￿
t;j .
14Since marginal costs are constant, the maximisation problems in the
Home and in the Foreign market can be treated separately. Log-linearisation
of the ￿rst-order conditions of the ￿rm around the steady state yields the
two optimal prices set by a Home traded good ￿rm that re-optimises at date
t:
1. Export price. This price is set in the foreign currency:
￿
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= (1 ￿ !￿)
2
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T￿
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(23)
2. Home-traded goods price. Symmetricaly, a similar expression to (23)
holds for the optimal price of a home-traded good sold on the home
market:
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(24)
Optimal traded goods prices are thus dependent on three main variables:
￿ the real marginal cost in the traded sector expressed in the currency of
the buyer,
￿
c mc
T
t ￿ b rst
￿
or c mc
T
t ;
￿ the price of non-traded goods in the destination market, b P N￿
t or b P N
t ;
￿ the price of their competitors in their respective market, b P T￿
H;t or b P T
H;t.
A comparison of the optimal prices (23) and (24) makes clear that home
monopolistic ￿rms, that take into account the impact of distribution costs on
the perceived demand elasticity and their relative prices which are di⁄erent
at home and abroad, ￿nd it optimal to charge di⁄erent prices in the Home
and in the Foreign economy.
15Non-traded goods producers. A non-traded intermediate goods ￿rm
chooses a price e pN
t to maximise
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The solution to this problem gives the optimal price set by a monopolistic
producer of non-traded goods as:
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Note that
￿N ￿ 1
￿N ￿ 1 + ￿N =
1
1 + ￿N￿
N ￿ A
where ￿
N is the steady state net desired mark-up and this expression is thus
the same as in Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004). In the CES case, ￿N = 0
and A = 1 which generates a constant mark-up. Eq. (26) implies that the
larger ￿N is the less sensitive the optimal price to marginal cost. This simple
relation shows that one can replicate any given e⁄ect of marginal costs on
prices by increasing ￿N and lowering !, i.e. ￿N enables the degree of nominal
rigidity to be reduced.
Imported goods. A foreign producer who sells a traded good on the home
market, yf;t (f), behaves symmetrically to a home exporter so that the anal-
ogous relation to (23) is
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163.5 Phillips curves
There are three equations describing in￿ ation in the Home country: one for
imported in￿ ation, one for domestic in￿ ation in the traded sector and another
for in￿ ation in the non-traded sector.
The price index for imports with Calvo-type contracts is determined by
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After linearisation the wholesale import price index for foreign goods results
in
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Combining (27) and (28) yields the Phillips curve for imports at the border:
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Proceeding along the same lines for home traded goods one gets:
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And for non-traded goods one obtains the Phillips curve:
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17The aggregate price index is
Pt =
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or in deviation from steady state
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And, in terms of in￿ ation,
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The total share of non-traded goods in the economy is the sum of non-traded
goods that enter directly into the consumption basket, CN, with weight
￿1
￿1+￿2+￿3 and of non-traded goods used as distribution services used to bring
home-traded and imported goods to consumers with weight
(￿2+￿3) ￿
1+￿
￿1+￿2+￿3 :
3.6 Monetary policy
To close the model, monetary policy is endogenous and takes the form of the
following feedback rule
b Rt = { b Rt￿1 + (1 ￿ {)
h
r￿ (b ￿t ￿ ￿) + rY
￿
b Yt ￿ b Y
P
t
￿i
+ "
R
t (35)
The parameter { gives the degree of interest rate smoothing and "R
t is a
temporary iid interest rate shock that will be dubbed a monetary policy
shock.
3.7 Factors a⁄ecting the ERPT
The pricing rule (23) illustrates the elements that a⁄ect the exchange rate
pass-through. The strength of the link between optimal export prices (in
foreign currency), marginal costs and exchange rate depends on the following
four main factors:
181. The timing of price adjustments. In a Calvo setting, individual ￿rms
cannot control the frequency of price revisions and must therefore in-
corporate their inability to reset their prices in their pricing decisions.
Less frequent price revisions, i.e. a high parameter ! lowers the pass-
through. However, in the long run, when all prices have received the
opportunity to adjust, this mechanism vanishes.
In order to better understand the remaining factors it is useful to
abstract from price-staggering and let ! be zero. Then (23) can be
rewritten in absolute rather than relative prices as:
b e p
T￿
h;t (h) =
￿
d MC
T
t ￿ b St
￿
￿
￿
￿
(￿T￿ ￿ 1 + ￿T￿)
h ￿
d MC
T
t ￿ b St
￿
￿ b P
N￿
t
i
￿
￿T￿
(￿T￿ ￿ 1 + ￿T￿)
h ￿
d MC
T
t ￿ b St
￿
￿ b P
T￿
H;t
i
(36)
If ￿
￿ = ￿T￿ = 0 which corresponds to the standard model without
distributive costs and with a constant demand elasticity, the last two
terms fall, the mark-up is constant and the ERPT is perfect.
2. The share of distribution services, ￿
￿. The value of ￿T￿ gives the per-
centage change in demand following a change in the "retail" price, i.e.
the price that the ￿nal user has to pay. Consider now a 10 p.c. in-
crease in the "wholesale" price, i.e. the price set by the traded goods
producer. Given that traded goods to reach the ￿nal consumer need to
be combined with non-tradables as distribution services, this increase
in the wholesale price only leads to a 1
(1+￿￿)10 p.c. increase in the retail
price according to its de￿nition (21). With a demand elasticity of ￿T￿,
the ensuing reduction in demand will be
h
1
(1+￿￿)￿T￿
i
￿10 p.c.. Thus, the
steady state "perceived" demand elasticity on the foreign market for
tradable goods is related to the "true" elasticity as follows
￿
T￿"p" =
1
(1 + ￿
￿)
￿
T￿
As a result of distributive trade, it is thus lower than the "true" foreign
demand price elasticity ￿T￿: In other words, the higher the distribution
margin, the lower the "perceived" or "e⁄ective" elasticity of demand.
Distribution margins reduce the pass-through of costs and exchange
rate to the wholesale price because ￿rms in the tradable sector realise
19when setting their prices that, in addition to their mark-up, the "retail"
price for their good has two cost components: their own price which is
determined by their own costs and by the ERPT and the distribution
costs required to sell their production on the domestic or the foreign
markets. Provided that the EPRT is positive, the weight on their own
price decreases when the home currency depreciates. Thus a deprecia-
tion is associated with a relatively low demand elasticity. The presence
of distribution services makes the mark-up contingent on the exchange
rate and on the marginal cost versus the price set in the non-traded
sector.
3. The curvature of the demand curve, ￿T￿. As in Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2007) and de Walque et al. (2005), I de￿ne the curvature as the
elasticity of the price elasticity of demand with respect to the relative
price at steady state:
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The curvature parameter of the "perceived" demand curve may be
derived as
￿
T￿ = 1 + ￿
T￿
￿
1 +
G000
G00
￿
which corresponds to Chari et al.￿ s (2000) result in the absence of distri-
bution margins14. When ￿T￿ > 0, the demand elasticity is an increasing
function of a ￿rm￿ s price relative to its competitors. A higher value of
￿T￿ reduces the pass-through since, for any given rise in its price, the
demand curve is more elastic which raises the cost of deviating from
the average price. In other words, if ￿rms do not want their price to
deviate too far from their competitors￿when they are allowed to ￿x
their price, then the presence of even a small number of ￿rms that see
a fall in their relative price because they do not change their price dis-
suades the adjusting ￿rms from making any major price changes and
deviating from the average behaviour. Note that in the absence of any
other shock to marginal costs, after depreciation of the exchange rate,
costs expressed in local currency rise by the same amount for all ￿rms
in a sector, so if prices are ￿ exible they will all rise by that amount and
14Coenen and Levin (2005) call this coe¢ cient the relative slope of the demand elasticity
around its steady state while Klenow and Willis (2005) call it the super-elasticity or the
rate of change of the elasticity.
20market shares and mark-ups remain constant. It is the combination
of staggered price-setting with a variable demand elasticity that makes
mark-ups variable. In a ￿ exible price equilibrium, c e p￿
ht (h) = c P ￿
H 8h,
the curvature parameter cancels itself out in (36) and, in the absence
of distribution, the desired mark-up would remain constant. The as-
sumption that ￿ decreases (increases) with the market share15 (relative
price) implies that each ￿rm￿ s mark-up of its price over marginal cost
is an increasing function of that ￿rm￿ s market share within its sector.
If the ￿rm has a market share approaching one, it perceives only the
sectoral elasticity of demand ￿ and chooses a constant mark-up equal to
￿
￿￿1. Thus a variable demand elasticity breaks the link between prices
and costs and raises the possibility that ￿rms will not pass changes in
cost one-for-one on to prices. Speci￿cally, if some ￿rms in a sector ex-
perience an increase in marginal cost relative to the other ￿rms in the
sector, these former ￿rms will lose market share and hence cut their
mark-up in equilibrium. As a result, the prices charged by these ￿rms
will rise by less than the rate of increase in their costs.
4. The "true" elasticity of demand, ￿T￿. In the abscence of real rigidities,
￿T￿ = ￿
￿ = 0, the demand elasticity would have no e⁄ect on the pass-
through. When one or both real rigidities is present the transitional
dynamics do depend on the value of the demand elasticity: a higher
elasticity increases the dynamic price response to both the marginal
cost and the exchange rate. So, for a given degree of curvature and
distribution services, the higher the price elasticity at steady state, the
smaller the steady state mark-up and thus the lower the margin for
a ￿rm, deviating from the symmetric equilibrium, to absorb exchange
rate and cost changes in its mark-up and thus the more closely its
optimal price will follow cost and exchange rate movements.
In a model without distribution, Bergin and Feenstra (2001) obtain im-
perfect exchange rate pass-through with ￿ exible prices because their translog
expenditure function aggregates goods traded internationally along with non-
traded goods. Foreign ￿rms thus compete with local producers that sell non-
traded goods and, to the extent that these competitors do not adjust their
prices when the exchange rate moves, they refrain from adjusting their own
price. However, as the number of traded goods increases, the ERPT also
increases because ￿rms will optimally follow what their competitors -who
become more homogenous- are doing. Imperfect pass-through with ￿ exible
15The demand elasticity is given by ￿
￿
z￿
t+j
￿
=
￿G0(z
￿
t+j)
z￿
t+jG00(z￿
t+j)
21prices thus requires traded goods to be competing with non-traded ones in
the same way as non-traded goods in the form of distribution services are
needed in my model. Apart from making the choice of curvature parameter
more ￿ exible, the di⁄erence lies in the degree of substitution between traded
and non-traded goods. In Bergin and Feenstra￿ s framework, the elasticity of
substitution among traded goods varieties is the same as the elasticity of sub-
stitution between traded and non-traded varieties. When non-traded goods
are introduced as distribution services, traded and non-traded varieties are
considered as complements, whereas the elasticity of substitution between
varieties of a given category - traded or non-traded - of goods, is higher and
may di⁄er between categories.
Interaction between ￿ and ￿: The combination of ￿ and ￿ is a novel
feature of the model. According to Woodford (2003), pricing decisions are
de￿ned as strategic complements if an increase in the prices charged for
other goods raises the ￿rm￿ s own optimal price. In my model the degree of
￿ strategic￿complementarity in price-setting is dependent on two channels:
￿ The ￿rst one is related to the price charged by non-traded goods ￿rms.
As in the CES model of Corsetti-Dedola (2005) and Corsetti et al.
(2006), strategic complementarity arises as a consequence of monopo-
listic competition and distribution services. An increase in the price of
non-tradables induces a ￿rm in the tradable sector to raise its price.
This id clearly apparent if one sets ￿ = 0 in (36) which then boils down
to:
c e p￿
ht (i) =
￿
d MCt ￿ b St
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿T￿ ￿ 1
￿￿
d MCt ￿ b St
￿
￿ b P
N￿
t
￿
which, in turn, is a log-linearised version of the expression obtained
by Corsetti and Dedola (2005). Thus, an increase in the price of non-
traded in the destination market raises the mark-up and the price set
by a traded goods ￿rm;
￿ The second channel is related to the average price of their competitors.
There are variations in desired mark-ups associated with changes in a
￿rm￿ s price relative to its competitors. This is in line with models that
use a Kimball aggregator or with the open economy model of Bergin
and Feenstra (2001).
However, when one allows for ￿T￿ > 0, the ￿rst channel is a⁄ected and
producers of tradables will reduce their response to an increase in the price
22set in the non-traded sector, i.e. the elasticity of the optimal traded goods
price to the price of non-traded goods decreases from ￿￿
￿T￿￿1 to ￿￿
￿T￿￿1+￿T￿. This
can be understood as follows. Given that the "retail" price of a traded good
is made up of two components - on the one hand, there is the own marginal
cost in the traded sector expressed in the currency of the buyer; and, on the
other hand, there is the price set by the distribution sector -, ￿rms in the
traded sector seeing a rise in the price of non-traded goods have less room
to pass their own cost increases on to prices since the variable elasticity rises
as their relative prices rise. Obviously, by de￿nition, a convex demand curve
implies that the loss of market share is an increasing function of the size of
the price change. In order to see to what extent larger price increases lead to
larger losses of market share, I use a Taylor series expansion of the elasticity
of demand around the steady state, as in Chary et al. (2000). The ￿rst-order
Taylor series expansion of ￿￿ (z￿
i) around z￿
i = 1 is given by
￿
￿ (z
￿
i) ￿ ￿
￿ (1) ￿
￿
1 + ￿
￿ (1) + ￿
￿ (1)
G000
G00
￿
￿ (z
￿
i ￿ 1)
where ￿T￿ = 1 + ￿T￿ + ￿T￿ G000
G00 .
Let us choose a curvature where a 1 p.c. increase in a ￿rm￿ s market share
which follows from a decrease in its relative price leads to a decline in the
elasticity of demand from 5 to 4.75 and an increase in the desired mark-up
from 1.25 to 1.2667. This parameterisation gives a value of ￿T￿ = 25 or
￿T￿ G000
G00 = 19. To further assess the implied convexity, Chary et al. (2000)
take a second-order Taylor expansion series of the demand function at steady
state, which is given by
z
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For ￿T￿ = 5 and ￿T￿ = 25, a 1 p.c. increase in the relative price leads
to a 5.6 p.c. decline in demand (as compared to 5 p.c. in the CES case),
whereas a 2 p.c. increase more than doubled the e⁄ect as it leads to a 12.7
p.c. reduction (as compared to 10 p.c. in the CES case). Therefore, allowing
the desired mark-up to depend increasingly on the ￿rm￿ s market share a⁄ects
the exchange rate pass-through by making it dependent not only on the scale
of the exchange rate change - the larger the depreciation, the lower the ERPT
- but also on the size and sign of changes in the price of non-traded goods
- the larger a positive change in the non-traded goods price, the larger the
increase in the elasticity and the larger the reduction in the desired mark-up
implying a lower ERPT.
233.8 Slope of the Phillips curve and Identi￿cation
Let us omit indexation and rewrite (30) as
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Table 1 reports parameterisations that all imply a slope of the Phillips
curve of 0.05. For a given elasticity of in￿ ation to real marginal cost, the
presence of a variable demand elasticity allows for more reasonable contract
duration as emphasised in Woodford (2005): here it comes down from 4.6
to 2.2 quarters. Without a distribution sector, all the parameterisations are
observationally equivalent in terms of in￿ ation dynamics: the coe¢ cients of
the marginal cost and of the traded good price are the same whatever the
choice of demand elasticity and curvature. In the presence of a distribution
sector, both the weight on the price of non-traded goods and the weight on
the price of traded goods vary with the steady-state demand elasticity. For
example, assuming a steady-state mark-up of 25 p.c. and a curvature para-
meter, ￿T = 25, where a 1 p.c. increase in relative price leads to a 5.5 p.c.
decrease in relative demand, or assuming a lower steady-state mark-up of
11 p.c., i.e. a doubling of the demand elasticity, and choosing a curvature
parameter such that a 1 p.c. increase in relative price also causes a doubling
of the loss of market share - from 5.5 to 11 p.c. - leads to di⁄erent coe¢ cients
for the aggregate price of non-traded and traded goods. This increase in de-
mand elasticity in turn leads to a smaller reaction of in￿ ation to both prices.
However, for a given demand elasticity, these coe¢ cients are the same for all
the choices of curvature which makes identi￿cation of the individual para-
meters impossible. In this case,
￿
￿T ￿ 1 ￿ ￿
￿
is independent of the curvature
parameter and the elasticity of in￿ ation to marginal cost, ￿p
￿T￿1￿￿
￿T￿1+￿T has
been constrained to be 0.05 for all speci￿cations. Thus, by construction, the
ratio
￿p
￿T￿1+￿T which in combination with ￿ and ￿T determines the sensitivity
of in￿ ation in the traded goods sector to the aggregate price of non-traded
and traded goods is the same for all degrees of curvature once ￿ and ￿T are
kept ￿xed.
24Table 1:
Combinations of parameters that yield the same Phillips curve slope
￿T ￿T ￿ ! ￿p
￿T￿1￿￿
￿T￿1+￿T mcT P N P T duration
5 0 0 0.803 0.050 1 0.05 0 -0.05 4.6
5 0 2/3 0.787 0.060 0.83 0.05 0.010 -0.060 4.2
5 25 0 0.554 0.363 0.14 0.05 0 -0.05 2.2
5 25 2/3 0.525 0.436 0.11 0.05 0.010 -0.060 2.1
10 50.2 0 0.569 0.330 0.15 0.05 0 -0.05 2.3
10 50.2 2/3 0.559 0.351 0.14 0.05 0.004 -0.053 2.3
4 Parameterisation and functioning
of the model
4.1 Parameterisation
This section is didactical and does not claim to be empirically realistic. An
empirical validation of the model is left for further work. To make the expla-
nation of the functioning of the model easier, I use a hypothetical symmetric
two-country economy: Home and Foreign countries have the same size and
parameter values. These parameters are summarised in table 2. A time
period in the model is taken to be a quarter.
A low degree of relative risk aversion (￿c = 1) and a high elasticity of
labour supply (￿l = 0:25) are chosen. The habit persistence parameter is
￿xed at 0.65. The subjective discount factor ￿ equals 0.99. The parameter
capturing the mark-up in wage setting is set at ￿w = 0:25.
The ￿0s are endogenously chosen to ensure that, at steady-state, whatever
the size of the distribution sector, the shares of non-traded, of home-traded
and of imports in GDP remain respectively at 0.5, 0.25 and 0.25. There is
thus no home bias in traded goods:
￿2
￿2+￿3 = 1=2:
The elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods is set
at 1.5 as in Chari et al.16 (2002) and the elasticity of substitution between
traded and non-traded goods is set at 1 as in many theoretical papers. This
is above the value of 0.74 suggested by Mendoza (1995) but, here, these
substitution possibilities only concern the traded versus non-traded as ￿nal
goods while the overall substitution is quite lower given the fact that non-
traded goods are complementary to traded ones in the form of distribution
16Bergin (2006) provides some evidence in favour of 1 and Lubik and Schorfheide (2005)
estimate it at 0.4.
25services.
I measure the distribution margin as a fraction ￿
1+￿ of the retail price.
Thus a 40 p.c. margin implies a value of 2/3 for the parameter ￿ as the
remaining 60 p.c. of the retail price represents the wholesale price. In this
model, the distribution sector is assumed to be competitive, so economic
pro￿ts are zero and the distribution margin re￿ ects the costs associated with
providing distribution services. If the distribution sector is monopolistically
competitive, the distribution margin also includes a mark-up component, as
in Corsetti et al. (2007).
The variable demand elasticity is parameterised by ensuring that net
mark-ups are equal to 0.25 across sectors at z (i) = 1. In the traded sector,
the curvature parameter is chosen so that a 2 p.c. increase in price reduces
demand by 11.9 p.c. as compared to 10 p.c. in the CES case. The proba-
bility of not changing prices is set at 0.525, implying an average duration of
2.1 quarters in the traded sector. In the non-traded sector, where nominal
stickiness is larger according to Alvarez et al. (2005); the parameter is cal-
culated to ensure that a weight on marginal cost in the in￿ ation equation is
close to 0.02 in both speci￿cations with and without the distribution sector,
a value commonly obtained in estimating the New Keynesian Phillips Curve.
In combination with a curvature parameter set at 20, it equals 0.71 with the
distribution sector and 0.63 without, corresponding to average durations of
respectively 3.4 and 2.7 quarters. The indexation parameters are set at 0.5
for prices and 0.75 for wages.
Finally, in order to keep things as simple as possible, the monetary policy
rule is assumed to re￿ ect a pure in￿ ation-targeting regime: the weight on
output is zero and the weight on in￿ ation is 1.5. The smoothing parameter
equals 0.9.
26Table 2: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
￿c degree of relative risk aversion 1
￿‘ inverse of elasticity of labour supply 0.25
h habit persistence 0.65
￿w probability of not changing wages 0.8
￿w degree of indexation (wages) 0.75
(1 + ￿w)=￿w elasticity of substitution (labour) 5
￿ elasticity of substitution (traded vs non-traded) 1
￿ elasticity of substitution (home vs foreign) 1.5
￿ discount factor 0.99
!T probability of not changing prices (traded) 0.525
￿p degree of indexation (prices) 0.5
￿T demand elasticity (traded) 5
￿T curvature 0; 25
￿ parameter governing the distribution margins 0; 2/3
!N probability of not changing prices (non-traded) 0.71; 0.63
￿N demand elasticity (non-traded) ￿T=(1 + ￿)
￿N curvature (non-traded) 20
￿1 bias towards non-traded goods endogenous
￿2 bias towards home-traded goods endogenous
￿3 bias towards foreign goods endogenous
{ degree of interest rate smoothing 0.9
r￿ coe¢ cient on current in￿ ation 1.5
rY coe¢ cient on output gap 0
4.2 Functioning of the model: Impulse responses to
shocks
4.2.1 Uncovered Interest Rate Parity shock
This subsection compares impulse responses to a Uncovered Interest Rate
Parity shock in four alternative speci￿cations. First, I look at nominal rigidi-
ties only. Then, real rigidities are introduced separately. The impact of dis-
tribution costs is considered ￿rst. I consider the case with distributive trade,
￿ > 0, but the demand function is still of the CES type by setting ￿T to zero
in the demand for traded goods. Then, I look at a variant of the model with a
variable demand elasticity, ￿T > 0, but without distribution margins, ￿ = 0.
The proportion of traded and non-traded goods in the ￿nal consumption bas-
ket remains the same as with distributive trade but here all non-traded-goods
27are directly bought by consumers from non-traded producers. Finally, the
model incorporates the real rigidities together. The full model is represented
by a bold continuous line, the model without distribution services by stars
￿ *￿ , the CES variant by the combination of a thin line and points ￿ ￿￿and the
model with only nominal stickiness by points ￿ ￿￿ .
The size of the shock is scaled so that it triggers a 10 p.c. depreciation
of the Home country exchange rate. It is assumed to be fairly persistent
(￿ = 0:9) with its e⁄ect on the real exchange rate dying out only slowly over
time. It a⁄ects both economies in a perfectly symmetric way. Because the
model is symmetric, I concentrate on the results for the Home economy.
Firms￿reactions: The ￿rst row of Figure 1 displays the optimal prices
charged by Foreign price-adjusting ￿rms on the Home market, called optimal
import price (at the border), as well as the optimal wholesale prices charged
by Home price-adjusting ￿rms on Home and Foreign markets. The second
row gives the respective price index accounting for ￿rms which cannot adjust
their price. All prices are expressed in the Home currency.
Of course, ￿rms would prefer to change their price in response to the
exchange rate or cost changes. However, in the Calvo framework they can
only do so when they receive the price "signal". There is thus some gradual
adjustment in all cases. In the presence of only nominal rigidities, both the
domestic optimal traded good price and the optimal price of Home goods
sold abroad increase slightly. On impact, the price that exporting ￿rms
are charging increases by some 2.4 p.c. This price increase then improves the
Home-traded goods ￿rms￿margins. Given that the exchange rate appreciates
by 10 p.c., this movement means that, once expressed in foreign currency,
the price of domestic goods sold abroad falls by some 7.6 p.c., implying a
high degree of pass-through.
When real rigidities are introduced, the optimal price of home-traded
goods does not increase as much. On the contrary, the optimal export price
increases even further: 3.6 p.c. when distribution is added, 7 when the
demand elasticity is variable and 7.6 when both real factors are taken into
account. The fact that domestic ￿rms set two di⁄erent prices at Home and
abroad is a clear illustration of how market segmentation breaks the link
between Home and Foreign demand and enables ￿rms to price to market.
As shown by the optimal import price the degree of ERPT at the border
strongly decreases when the variable elasticity is used. When the demand
elasticity increases with the relative price, ￿rms do not want to price di⁄er-
ently than their competitors and lose (gain) market share by in(de)creasing
their relative price. Therefore, with endogenous mark-ups, the shock trans-
28lates into optimal price very gradually as re-optimised individual prices feed
into the aggregate price and reduce the impact of price adjustments on mar-
ket share. In contrast, when the elasticity of demand is constant ￿rms which
can re-optimise are less reluctant to raise (reduce) their price more on impact
since they do not consider the impact of charging a higher (lower) price than
their competitors.
When the distribution margin is set at 40 p.c. instead of zero, there is
a smaller increase in both the optimal Home price of traded goods and in
the optimal Home currency price of imports. As noted, an increase in ￿
lowers the "perceived" demand elasticity faced by traded goods producers
and reduces the exchange rate pass-through to the wholesale price. Thus,
exporters reduce their price in foreign currency by less than they would when
￿ is zero. As a result, once expressed in Home currency, export price further
increases.
As expected, raising the demand elasticity, i.e. reducing ￿, increases the
exchange rate pass-through on optimal prices: Home producers￿export price
falls more in Foreign currency and Foreign producers￿export price on the
Home market increases more in Home currency. In addition, the di⁄erence is
even greater under the CES speci￿cation. As explained above, when ￿T > 0
producers of tradables reduce their response to an increase in the price set
in the non-traded sector because they have less margin for increasing their
price given that the variable elasticity rises as their relative prices rise. The
e⁄ect of distributive trade is thus relatively smaller when the elasticity of
demand is increasing with the relative price.
This being said, the most striking di⁄erence introduced by distribution
trade is its impact on the retail price of import and on the expenditure-
switching e⁄ects it generates.
Macroeconomic responses: On impact, the exchange rate overshoots its
steady state. The ￿rst column of Figure 1-a illustrates how the exchange rate
pass-through decreases along the pricing chain, i.e. it is highest for those
￿rms that can re-optimise. Once aggregated with ￿rms that do not reset
their price, this yields the import price at the border, then the retail price
of imports and ￿nally, on the second panel of last row, the consumer price.
Note that with no distribution margin both import prices are equal. In both
CES cases, the maximum impact on import price "at the border" and on
consumer price is reached after 3 quarters and 5 quarters respectively. When
the elasticity is variable, there is much more smoothness and these delays
increase substantially to 5 and 9 quarters respectively.
A rise in import price and a reduction in export price expressed in for-
29eign currency induce a shift in demand towards domestic traded goods so
that net exports improve substantially17. On the other hand, the current
or expected deterioration in the terms of trade generates a negative wealth
e⁄ect. Moreover with the simple monetary policy rule as in (35), the in-
terest rate increases and consumption decreases. All in all, following the
depreciation, Home output increases.
Although import prices "at the border" change the most with the CES ag-
gregator, variations in net exports do not follow the same ranking. Expenditure-
switching e⁄ects are in fact conditioned by the "retail" price of imports as in
(11) where import demand depends on P TD
F . Given that the "retail" price
increases less in the presence of distributive trade, import volumes decrease
less and their mirror image, export volumes, increases to a lesser extent. In
addition, when distributive trade is added to the model, output in the non-
traded sector falls even more sharply following the depreciation: there is a
reduction in demand for non-traded goods used as retail services. There is
also a limited increase in demand as a result of a reduction in non-traded
output combined with a much lower net export improvement.
In the variants in which producers set prices while striving to maintain
competitiveness against other producers, all price e⁄ects are smaller. In
particular, the consumer price increases less and the response of monetary
policy is less aggressive which results in a lower real interest rate. This
induces a smaller reduction in consumption.
However, the striking di⁄erence in the output responses stems from the
non-traded sector. In both scenarios with a distribution margin, there is a
marked reduction of output in the non-traded sector accompanying the fall
in imports. This reduction in distributive trade combined with a compres-
sion of domestic consumption keeps output almost at steady state despite
the increase in exports. Without distributive trade, not only do net export
improves more but also the decrease in the production of non-traded goods
is very limited, which tends to boost domestic output.
Let us de￿ne the terms of trade as the ratio of the Home-currency price
received on home goods exported abroad over the Home-currency price paid
for goods imported from abroad. Under traditional Keynesian sticky-price
models, the terms of trade decrease following domestic currency depreciation
as the home-currency price paid for goods imported increases while the price
received for exports does not change. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000) provide
empirical evidence of a negative comovement between the nominal exchange
17The chosen value for the elasticity of substitution (1.5) may be responsible for the
scale of this result. A lower value as estimated by Bergin (2006) or Lubik and Schorfeide
(2005) would reduce the net export boom.
30rate and the terms of trade ( a weaker currency is associated with a worsen-
ing of the terms of trade) and use it against the LCP hypothesis. Conversely,
Bergin (2006) carries out a maximum likelihood estimate of a two-country
model on US and G7 data and ￿nds that a large proportion of ￿rms be-
haves according to the assumption of Local Currency Pricing. In the current
Pricing-To-Market environment, currency depreciation causes a temporary
improvement of the terms of trade in all three cases where real rigidities
come on top of the nominal price stickiness. Therefore, although the model
generates a positive e⁄ect on the trade balance on impact, terms of trade
movements contradict Obstfeld and Rogo⁄￿ s argument.18 However, after 3
quarters at most (when demand elasticity is variable), the model starts to
show some deterioration in the terms of trade as the price paid for imported
goods is above the price received for exported goods.
What drives RER movements? The real exchange rate ￿ uctuates if
Home and Foreign price levels are not perfectly correlated and an imperfect
ERPT breaks this perfect correlation. Given that the movements in CPIs are
larger under the CES speci￿cation, the real exchange rate depreciates some-
what less on impact than in the cases with a variable elasticity of demand.
Although the real exchange rate is by and large similar across the four
models, the underlying factors explaining its movements di⁄er considerably.
In log deviations, the real exchange rate is: b rs = b s + b P ￿ ￿ b P. Working in
￿rst di⁄erences and substituting Home in￿ ation, ￿, by (34) and ￿￿ by the
similar expression for the foreign economy, after some further manipulations,
one can decompose changes in the real exchange rate as follows19:
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18The addition of oil or commodities that are priced in a foreign currency could easily
make the model conform more closely with Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ views.
19The implied values for the parameters are given in brackets underneath.
31Benigno and Thoenissen (2003) label these three sources of variation as:
￿rs = Internal Exchange Rate
+ Home bias
+ Market Segmentation
Note that, due to the presence of distribution services, the ratio of Home
and Foreign import prices in Benigno and Thoenissen (2003) has been fur-
ther decomposed into the contribution of the import price "at the border"
and of the distribution services needed to bring imports to the ￿nal de-
mand. These distribution services constitute an additional (indirect) chan-
nel through which changes in non-tradable prices a⁄ect the (internal) real
exchange rate.
The Internal Exchange Rate channel allows the real exchange rate to devi-
ate from PPP through the presence of non-traded goods in the consumption
basket both as ￿nal consumption goods and as distribution services. The
former is represented by the terms involving ￿￿
1 and ￿1 in the ￿rst row of
(38), while ￿￿
1+￿￿ and ￿
1+￿ account for the latter. Thus, the higher the impor-
tance of the non-traded goods, the larger the real exchange rate sensitivity
to changes in the relative price of non-tradables. As can be seen from the
lower panel of Figure 1-c, this channel is responsible for twice as large a real
exchange rate depreciation in the model with a constant demand elasticity
than in the other two variants. In the CES cases, since traded goods ￿rms
do not aim to preserve their market share, they set prices more aggressively
so that in￿ ation in the Home-traded sector increases more and the relative
price of non-traded goods thus decreases more.
The market segmentation channel highlights di⁄erences in prices in the
same currency of traded goods across countries. In terms of level, market
segmentation allows ￿rms to price-to-market. If ￿rms face di⁄erent elastici-
ties of demand in di⁄erent markets as in the presence of distributive trade,
this causes absolute PPP to fall. In the transitional dynamics depicted in
the impulse responses, this channel a⁄ects the real exchange rate because
there is incomplete pass-through from the exchange rate to prices so that
the law of one price does not hold. As seen by comparing Figure 1-a and
1-c, the lower the exchange pass-through, the greater the contribution of the
market segmentation channel. On the contrary, if the pass-through is perfect
(which is the case, for instance, in the Producer Currency Pricing model),
this channel would not contribute to the variability of the real exchange rate.
The home bias channel allows the real exchange rate to deviate from PPP
through changes in the price of imported goods relative to those of the domes-
tic tradable goods. The higher the degree of home bias,
￿
￿2
￿2+￿3 ￿
￿￿
3
￿￿
2+￿￿
3
￿
,
32the more deviations in these terms of trade lead to deviations in the real ex-
change rate. However, in the simple symmetric two-country framework used
here, this term cancels itself out.
Nominal trade balance adjustment: In the context of the ongoing de-
bate on the reduction of large external imbalances, it is worth looking at
the implications for the process of adjustment of imperfect ERPT. A Home
currency depreciation has a moderate impact on the price of domestic goods
in the world markets and on the ensuing expenditure-switching e⁄ects. How-
ever, what matters for long-run stability is the nominal trade balance and
the adjustment can thus be achieved by changes either in import and export
volumes or in the terms of trade.
In a static partial equilibrium framework with complete exchange rate
pass-through, a depreciation of the Home currency leads to an improvement
in the trade balance if the Marshall-Lerner condition is satis￿ed, i.e. if the
sum of the import and export price elasticities is greater than one, j ￿ j + j
￿
￿ j> 1, with the parameter ￿ being the elasticity of substitution between
Home and Foreign goods as de￿ned in (12).
In a model with no distribution sector, Gust and Sheets (2006) show that
when trade price elasticities are near unity, a one p.c. depreciation of the
exchange rate improves the trade balance by roughly one p.c. of the value of
exports, regardless of the extent of the pass-through. In the present model
with a distribution sector this is no longer the case.
Given that a Leontief technology has been assumed for the distribution
services, the demand for imports moves proportionally to demand for im-
ported and distributed goods, which in log-linearised form is
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The price of imported and distributed goods is given by
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1
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N
where b P T
F has been de￿ned in (27). Recalling the de￿nition of the real ex-
change rate, b rs = b s + b p￿ ￿ b p; the derivative of the "retail" import price with
respect to the exchange rate is
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33and the derivative of real import is
@b Y T
F
@b s
=
￿￿
1 + ￿
￿
￿T ￿ 1 ￿ ￿
￿T ￿ 1 + ￿T
￿
.
In log deviation, the trade balance as a percentage of the value of exports is
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As expected, this relationship shows that the size and the sign of the adjust-
ment depend on the response of the terms of trade and real net exports. The
partial equilibrium e⁄ect of an exchange rate change on the nominal trade
balance, ￿; is
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Contrary to the case where ￿ = 0, even if trade price elasticities are unity
i.e. ￿
￿ = ￿ = 1 the nominal adjustment still depends on the pass-through.
In the short run, if it is costly to reallocate demand between home and
imported goods, the e⁄ective elasticity of substitution is lower than ￿ and
the response of the trade balance to exchange rate changes will be subdued.
When both countries are symmetric and if ￿ < 1+￿ (which seems the most
realistic case), a one p.c. depreciation (increase in s) will improve the nominal
trade balance by less than one p.c.. The improvement is weaker the greater
the pass-through. In other words, for high curvature parameter values, the
improvement in the nominal trade balance will be signi￿cant. Import prices
do not change much in local currency terms so that the depreciating country
experiences an improvement in its terms of trade, its import price hardly
changes whereas its export price expressed in its own currency increases
while real net exports rise slightly. On the contrary, if the pass-through to
import prices is signi￿cant (
￿T￿1￿￿
￿T￿1+￿T close to 1) and the home export price is
therefore insensitive to the exchange rate, then a depreciation leads to a larger
increase in real net exports. Complete pass-through enhances adjustment of
real trade volume. For identical Home and Foreign countries, the above
condition becomes
@b ￿
@b s
> 0 () 1 + 2
￿
￿
1 + ￿
￿ 1
￿￿
￿T ￿ 1 ￿ ￿
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34An increase in ￿ reduces the real trade e⁄ect, exports increase less and
imports decrease less in the variant with distribution services but, at the
same time, together with the curvature parameter it reduces the exchange
rate pass-through and improves the terms of trade. From this condition it is
clear that the real trade e⁄ect dominates since it determines the sign of the
second term in the inequality. This will be positive if and only if ￿
1+￿ > 1
which, according to the chosen parameter values, only occurs when ￿ = 0.
The impulse responses conform with this partial equilibrium condition: the
variant without distribution services leads to the largest improvement in the
trade balance. Although the terms of trade are comparable to the results
with distribution, the improvement in net exports is far larger. Net foreign
assets holdings, con￿rms even more clearly how distributive trade reduces the
improvement in a country￿ s external position. With a distribution sector, the
second term becomes negative and, in that case, the lower the pass-through,
i.e. the higher ￿T, the less this second term is negative and thus the larger
the improvement in the trade balance will be. However, there is some critical
value for the trade elasticity. When ￿ > 1 + ￿, the second term is positive
and a lower pass-through will reduce the improvement20.
4.2.2 Increase in trade openness
Over the past decade, the world economy has experienced increasing glob-
alisation. Firstly, this phenomenon has been accompanied by greater trade
openness as measured by the share of imports in GDP. For instance, in the
euro area, this share has grown from an average of 23 p.c. during the period
1980-1994 to 33 p.c. over the period 1995-200521. Secondly, increased global
competition has often been associated with a reduction in the level of in￿ a-
tion in the euro area and the US. One reason for this is that it may have
made the demand curve facing domestic producers more elastic, since it has
made more "substitute" goods available to domestic consumers. Thirdly, as
emphasised by Marazzi and Sheets (2007), globalisation may have caused a
reduction in the ERPT.
This section provides a quantitative assessment of the di⁄erences in the
transmission channels of a 10 p.c. depreciation of the home currency following
a UIRP shock as the trade openness of the economy varies. Beyond its
direct impact on the level of in￿ ation, globalisation may have altered the
20Note that this may make estimating the trade elasticity tricky.
21These ￿gures include intra-euro area trade. For US and UK the import content of
GDP increases respectively from 8 and 14 p.c. to 14 and 26 p.c respectively over the same
sub-periods.
35dynamics of in￿ ation, namely the relation between in￿ ation, marginal costs
and exchange rate. With prices increasingly set in global markets, ￿rms have
less room to pass higher costs or exchange rate movements on to their prices
and thus have to absorb more of these ￿ uctuations in their pro￿t margins.
Empirical studies on the relationship between openness or globalisation and
mark-ups are scarce but it might be that the e⁄ect of the increasing share
of imports in total demand is strong. For example, using data from UK
manufacturing ￿rms, Bouhol et al (2006) estimate that a one percentage
point increase in the share of imports in demand leads to a reduction of
around one percentage point in the mark-up.
On the basis of these observations, globalisation is introduced in the
model through a 10 percentage point increase in the share of imports in
demand, i.e. from 25 p.c. to 35 p.c.. This increase in the share of imports is
assumed to be accompanied by a 10 percentage point reduction in the steady-
state mark-up. In other words, the demand elasticity at steady state rises
from 5 to 7.7. Higher demand elasticity will lead to an increase in the ERPT
to the import price and an increase in the Phillips curve slope. In addition,
other things being equal, an increase in the share of imports in demand will
raise the dependence of consumer prices on exchange rate movements. The
empirical evidence reviewed in section 2 pointed instead a reduction in the
ERPT at both the import price and the consumer price levels. If the demand
elasticity also changes with market conditions other than the relative price,
e.g. the degree of openness, it would play a crucial role in trying to reconcile
these con￿ icting observations. Sbordone (2008) analyses channels through
which an increase in trade openness a⁄ects the in￿ ation process. Based on
the intuition that the more goods are traded in a market, the more likely the
demand is to fall in response to a small increases in prices, she makes the
demand elasticity dependent on the number of goods traded (as a proxy for
trade openness).
Figures 2-a and 2-b show the model responses to an increase in openness
when the curvature is unchanged22 and when the curvature is higher. In the
latter case, it is such that a one p.c. decrease in relative demand leads to a
10 p.c. increase in demand elasticity.
Of course, in qualitative terms, the responses are in line with the responses
of the variants presented in the previous section, although di⁄erences arise
in the quantitative impacts. The currency depreciation raises import prices
relative to domestic prices, and domestic producers respond to weaker com-
22The curvature is unchanged in the sense that a one percent decrease in relative demand
still leads to a 5 p.c. increase in demand elasticity. Given that the demand elasticity is
raised to 7.7, the curvature parameter, ￿, equals 38.
36petition from imports by increasing their desired mark-ups. In a more open
economy the exchange rate pass-through to import prices is higher but the
"relative" import price increases less. Given that more of their competitors
are foreign, this weaker competition from imports is more keenly felt and
domestic ￿rms have more incentive to raise their mark-ups. Higher domestic
prices, higher import prices and a bigger share of imports in consumption
eventually lead to a bigger increase in consumer prices. Consumption declines
to a larger extent in the more open economy as both prices and interest rates
faced by consumers increase more. The improvement in net exports a⁄ects
a larger part of output which thus expands further.
The higher degree of strategic complementarity ￿rst substantially reduces
the ERPT to import prices. As expected when the curvature is higher, both
foreign and domestic ￿rms are more reluctant to raise their prices and the
increase in mark-up is thus lower than it would be with an unchanged de-
gree of curvature. Hence, the response of in￿ ation is lower with a higher
curvature. However, it remains higher than in a more closed economy. Con-
sumption decreases less when the curvature is high. At the same time, the
expenditure-switching e⁄ect causes net exports to move in the opposite di-
rection to consumption. Overall, one expects output to increase to a greater
extent in a more open economy since the share of imports in demand is
by de￿nition larger. Nevertheless, when a higher curvature mitigates the
expenditure-switching e⁄ects, this is less the case.
In this short exercise on globalisation, variable desired mark-ups have
proved important in reducing the ERPT to import prices. However, an
implausibly high degree of curvature would be needed to account for the
possible decline in the ERPT to the CPI. Other mechanisms than only those
a⁄ecting price formation are probably at work: ￿rms may be forced to do
what they can to keep their costs from rising and, as advocated by Mishkin
(2008), sound monetary policies aimed at maintaining price stability have
also contributed to reduce the pass-through of exchange rate ￿ uctuations to
consumer prices.
5 Conclusions
This paper examines which mechanisms are likely to help dampen price pres-
sures in the wake of exchange rate movements. In addition to nominal fric-
tions frequently used in sticky-price models, it jointly introduces two features
that have hitherto been considered separately in the existing literature, i.e.
a variable demand elasticity and distribution services. The aggregator pro-
duces demand functions which are more elastic for ￿rms that increase their
37prices than for ￿rms whose relative price declines as a result of price sticki-
ness. Such a variable elasticity leads to mark-up variations which are highly
plausible in current open economies. As suggested by Gust et al. (2006),
part of the decline in the exchange rate pass-through might be related to
greater trade integration. In a global world, where it is increasingly impor-
tant to maintain market share, ￿rms are likely to prefer to adjust mark-ups
rather than prices in response to a change in the exchange rate, disconnect-
ing import prices from exchange rates. Further, the presence of a non-traded
distribution sector reduces the e⁄ective price elasticity of import demand and
generates market segmentation.
The model serves to examine the respective role of each feature. The
paper shows that both separation of national markets through distribution
services and imperfect competition with variable mark-ups leading to pricing-
to-market are important for accounting for the observed stability of import
prices in local currency at the border. Hence, when nominal frictions ￿ la
Calvo are present, the stability of import prices in local currency does not
depend exclusively on price rigidities which results in more realistic durations
of price contracts. Yet, when prices are ￿ exible, the presence of non-traded
goods is necessary to generate an imperfect pass-through.
To gauge the merits of the model, an empirical analysis should be con-
ducted. Although, for the sake of simplicity, the model has left capital out,
its introduction would make the model more suitable for estimation. This is
left for further work.
6 Appendix
Derivation of Eq. (23)
The ￿rst-order condition for export price is
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where I made use of the fact that RS = S P￿
P and mc = MC
P : Note that the
real marginal cost is de￿ned as the ratio of MC to the aggregate price in the
Home economy and not to any (sectorial) price in the Foreign economy.
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To continue, write ￿rst (39) as
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Now proceed to the linearisation of (43) around the steady state
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one can rewrite (44) as follows
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minus the same expression in t+1 multiplied by (!￿) gives the optimal price
for a producer that can reset its price as:
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As in Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) and de Walque et al. (2005), the
curvature is de￿ned as the elasticity of the price elasticity of demand with
respect to the relative price at steady state:
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which enables (45) to be written in terms of the model parameters as in (23).
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